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IntroductIon
Since the 1970s all the political forces in Germany have treated 
Russia as a key economic and political partner for both itself 
and also the whole of Western Europe. There was a break-
through with German reunification in 1990s which was inter-
preted both in Berlin and in Moscow as laying the foundations 
for a “strategic partnership”. The expectation was that a rein-
forcement of the mutual economic and political links between 
the two countries would lead to synergies. German business 
would gain access to the Russian market, and the country 
would have special political relations making it a go-between 
for Russia and the European Community enabling it to help 
ensure stability and security in Europe, and especially in the 
post-Soviet area. Russia’s voice was to be taken into account in 
debates on the future of Europe, and Germany’s voice would be 
heard in discussions concerning Russia’s political and econom-
ic reforms.
Recently, however, the German media have been correctly de-
scribing the atmosphere between the Chancellor’s Office and the 
Kremlin as the chilliest in years. Various factors have laid bare 
the fact that the strategic partnership between Germany and Rus-
sia is at best currently undergoing a ‘technical pause’: the under-
whelming outcomes of the German-Russian intergovernmental 
consultations in the autumn of 2012 and of Chancellor Merkel’s 
meeting with President Putin during the Hanover fair in the 
spring of 2013, as well as the way in which the EU dealt with the 
Cyprus debt issue and, finally, the support that Germany has ex-
tended to the anti-presidential protests in Ukraine. Presumably, 
however, it would be more correct to ask if, perhaps, Germany 
is about to undertake a deeper revision of the political and ideo-
logical foundations on which German-Russian relations have so 
far been based. In all spheres of mutual relations, Germany is no 
longer willing to keep accepting the “take-or-pay” principle and is 
starting to demand much more from Russia. 
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Germany’s current critical debate on Russia and its government is 
unprecedented for numerous reasons, including the fact that this 
time the German media, which has always been more sceptical 
about Russia, has been joined by many experts and politicians, 
including from the highest levels of government. The critical and 
realistic assessments of the directions of Russia’s political and eco-
nomic development under Vladimir Putin’s rule have coincided 
in Germany with complaints about the shortages of research and 
education on Russia and the resulting erosion of expert knowl-
edge on Russia available in Germany.1 Meanwhile, the priorities 
of Germany’s foreign and economic policy have changed consid-
erably, not only as a result of the eurozone crisis, but also, even 
more importantly, because the attention of German business and 
politics has been shifting to the so-called neue Gestaltungsmächte, 
or new regional powers. German politicians increasingly believe 
that Russia should not be offered new methods or mechanisms of 
co-operation. Firstly, because the existing ones have not been ful-
ly utilised, and secondly, because Germany at this stage seems to 
have no idea of what the long-term strategy of co-operation with 
Putin’s Russia should be. Consequently, the most frequent answer 
to questions about a new concept of Germany’s policy towards Rus-
sia is “abwarten”, or “wait and see”. However, waiting for a change 
of leadership, and also a change in Russia’s internal policy that 
could lead to democratisation and the development of the middle 
class as a vector of social change and economic transformation 
will require a lot of patience. Moreover, Germany’s hope that such 
a transformation, once it happens, will also produce a change in 
Russia’s foreign policy, may never materialise given the consen-
sus prevailing in Russia, including among Putin’s critics, that the 
objective of Russia’s foreign policy should be to restore the coun-
try to its position as a global power.
1 For more information, see: M. Sapper, Niedergang und Neuanfang. Die 
Krise der deutschen Russlandexpertise, Osteuropa, 6-8/2012.
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Another factor that has been undermining the idea of strategic 
German-Russian relations concerns the conviction which has 
been held by the Russian elite since the eurozone crisis, that the 
European Union, seen as a principally German project, is unat-
tractive and weak. This perception has bolstered the Russian 
elite’s belief that Europe needs Russia more than Russia needs 
Europe. In the meantime, Vladimir Putin has been promoting the 
creation of the Eurasian Union while making no secret of the fact 
that the organisation is meant to serve as a counterbalance to the 
European Union and a way for Russia to retain its “sphere of influ-
ence”, especially in the post-Soviet area. 
The present paper presents the causes and the structure of the 
change in Germany’s approach to Russia. It is not a detailed or ex-
haustive analysis of the German-Russian relations over the last 
twenty years, but rather an overview and assessment of the main 
trends in the development of the two countries’ co-operation. It 
also offers some predictions about the future dynamics of rela-
tions from the German point of view. 
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SuMMArY
1. German perceptions of the policies pursued by the Russian 
leadership have changed considerably in recent years. The 
critical and realistic attitude towards Russia, which until re-
cently had been limited to the German media and some ex-
perts, is now increasingly shared by ever wider swathes of the 
public2 and the intellectual elite. In this situation, the political 
elite, too, has discovered that it can afford more openness and 
a change of tone in relations with representatives of the Rus-
sian leadership. Germany’s Christian Democrats in particular 
have been critical of Russia, but – while opinions on Russia are 
still divided – the divisions run not so much along party lines 
as within all of the major political forces in Germany. 
2. The perceptions of Russia have changed not only because of 
developments there (including Vladimir Putin’s return to 
power and his increasingly aggressive policy aimed at rebuild-
ing Russia’s position as a global power, restoring its sphere of 
influence, and suppressing any civil society activity) but also 
because Germany’s politics changed course as the country’s 
attention shifted to the new regional powers and Berlin be-
came interested in establishing close political and economic 
co-operation with those countries (in particular China), de-
veloping special strategies for them or starting resource part-
nerships. 
3. In this new context, Russia’s relative importance has been di-
minishing; the country remains important for German busi-
ness and politics, but it is no longer Germany’s only important 
area of interest or the only major co-operation partner aside 
from the EU and the US. Russia’s power has been increasingly 
2 See: http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-539C3372-
693DB141/bst/xcms_bst_dms_38167_38168_2.pdf; http://www.pewglobal.
org/2013/09/03/global-opinion-of-russia-mixed/
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defined in terms of its potential for destruction, rather than its 
attitude towards partnership. On matters such as the reduc-
tion of nuclear weapons stockpiles, the veto rights of the UN 
Security Council, or the resolution of international conflicts in 
the Middle East, Eastern Europe or the Caucasus, Russia has 
increasingly often turned out to be an unconstructive part-
ner or a partner of diminishing importance (e.g. as a result of 
the withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan). Still, none 
of the political parties in Germany sees Russia as a military 
threat to Europe. Unable to treat Putin as a reliable partner for 
wider co-operation in the areas of foreign and security policy, 
and confronted with the fact that Germany currently lacks 
the concept of a broader strategy towards Russia, Berlin has 
lately tended to adopt a wait-and-see attitude. This does not 
mean that it has been unwilling to seek compromises, but it 
will not seek them at any cost. 
4. Russia remains an important economic partner for Germany 
but in future, following the fiasco of the Partnership for Mod-
ernisation, mainly large German corporations will continue to 
benefit from this. Meanwhile the Energiewende, i.e. Germany’s 
energy transformation aimed at achieving energy self-suffi-
ciency, may reduce Germany’s dependence on supplies of en-
ergy resources, including oil and gas from Russia. The energy 
revolution in the United States, brought on by shale gas produc-
tion and the resulting oversupply of gas, will also help Germany 
gain energy independence. Finally, the free trade agreement 
currently being negotiated between the EU and the United 
States (the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, or 
TTIP) may have similar, positive consequences for Germany. 
5. Russia will undoubtedly remain a very important partner 
for Germany but over time Germany’s bargaining position in 
shaping its co-operation with Russia will gain strength. This 
process is in line with Germany’s diplomacy’s strategy to-
wards Russia.
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I. FroM StrAtegIc pArtnerShIp to no IdeA 
how to deAl wIth ruSSIA
The Russian-German relations have been commonly regarded as 
special at least since the times of Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik.3 the 
process of germany’s reunification, which Mikhail gor-
bachev approved of, further reinforced this perception. 
however, it was during chancellor gerhard Schröder’s term 
in office (1998–2005) that the two countries developed par-
ticularly close relations. the exceptional nature of those 
relations went further than long-standing and ever closer 
economic co-operation, which was best exemplified by the 
decision to build the nord Stream pipeline, made during this 
period and based on economic as well as political considera-
tions. there was also the spectacular „exceptional man to 
man friendship” between putin and Schröder, manifested 
by the two leaders at every opportunity. Frank-walter Stein-
meier, one of Schröder’s closest associates and the minister 
of foreign affairs in Angela Merkel’s first government (2005–
2009), sought to continue the policy of strategic partnership 
with russia. despite his efforts, however, relations with 
russia became increasingly complicated and it was becom-
ing ever more difficult to believe that they were strategic in 
nature. the re-appointment of Steinmeier as the chief of ger-
many’s diplomacy in the new grand coalition government in 
2013 will probably bring about no major breakthroughs.
the 2008 war in georgia, the fiasco of the partnership for 
Modernisation, and especially putin’s return to the post 
of president of the russian Federation in 2012 hastened 
the change of perceptions of russia in germany, not only 
among the wider public, but also among experts and politi-
cians. chancellor Angela Merkel’s reserved attitude towards 
Vladimir putin, in both his roles as prime minister and 
3 If only the most recent history is taken into account.
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president, was also conducive to this change. As a result, the 
existence of a set of contentious issues that had remained un-
resolved for years, such as the visa regime, the restitution of 
cultural assets, or human rights violations in russia, start-
ed to be raised with greater frequency and openness. there 
was growing frustration with russia’s unwillingness to co-
operate, its aggressive treatment of the opposition and the 
unpredictability of its leadership, and germany stopped put-
ting forward any new initiatives, either in its bilateral rela-
tions with russia or in the european union’s policy towards 
the country. while the proposals concerning germany’s for-
eign policy, put forward in the cdu/cSu-Spd coalition agree-
ment in november 2013, do point to an urgent need to develop 
a strategy on russia, german politicians have not as yet come 
up with any concrete suggestions. 
The concept of a strategic partnership between Russia and Ger-
many was first proposed during the two countries’ intergov-
ernmental consultations in Berlin in 2000. It provided that the 
partnership would be based primarily on intensive economic co-
operation and an extensive structure of institutionalised political 
co-operation. The original concept also envisaged a social dimen-
sion, i.e. the development of close people-to-people contacts. How-
ever, due to Russia’s heavy bureaucracy and its system of “sover-
eign democracy”4 the social dimension never fully materialised.5 
4 The term was created by Vladislav Surkov, see:
http://labuszewska.blog.onet.pl/2013/05/08/koniec-suwerennej-demokracji/ 
5 However, nearly 40 branches of the Goethe Institute are operating in Rus-
sia, all German political foundations are present there, and many Russian-
German partnerships between cities, universities, etc. have been conclud-
ed. These activities can be seen as positivistic “work at the foundations”, 
which will certainly bear fruit in the longer term. 
In the political dimension, the so-called Petersburg Dialogue was also an 
element of institutional co-operation – while it formally met the criteria 
of dialogue between social organisations, only government-designated or-
ganisations were allowed to take part on the Russian side, meaning that the 
dialogue did not contribute in any way to the development of civil society 
in Russia. Its wasted potential, conservative character and the controver-
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At the onset of the present century, the two countries perceived 
close mutual co-operation as an opportunity to boost their inter-
national standing, especially in opposition to the United States.6 
Russia sought to bolster its aspirations to be a global power, and 
wanted to have an advocate – and also a key partner – in the EU. 
Meanwhile Germany was going through the process of “gaining 
independence” from the United States, and was demonstrating 
unprecedented assertiveness in trans-Atlantic relations.7 The 
rapprochement between Russia and Germany was facilitated both 
by the personal friendship between Putin and Schröder and by 
the attachment of the entire German political class to Chancellor 
Willy Brandt’s concept of “change through rapprochement” and 
its later variation developed by Steinmeier, i.e. “rapprochement 
through mutual ties”. 
Economic co-operation, which the German government support-
ed both politically and through loan guarantees, played the great-
est role in building those mutual bonds. It was characterised by 
a deep asymmetry in favour of Germany and a heavy focus on the 
energy sector,8 motivated by the deeply held conviction on both 
sides that Russia and Germany were mutually dependent in terms 
sial selection of participants from both countries soon attracted criticism in 
Russia and especially in Germany. 
6 The Russians are still using this rhetoric. See: the article by Vladimir 
Yakunin, the Russian politician and diplomat and close aide of Vladimir 
Putin, titled Von Lissabon bis Wladiwostok. Europa und Russland könnten 
gemeinsam zur Supermacht werden, stark wie USA und China. Vorurteile 
verhindern das, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 10.07.2013.
7 For more information on the attempts at building a Russia-Germany-France 
axis see: Adam Szymański, Ernest Wyciszkiewicz, Spotkania Putin–
Schröder–Chirac – znaczenie i perspektywy (The Putin–Schröder–Chirac 
meetings: importance and prospects), http://www.pism.pl/index/?id=2a9d
121cd9c3a1832bb6d2cc6bd7a8a7
8 Cf.: Iwona Wiśniewska, Współpraca gospodarcza Rosja–Niemcy (Russian-
German economic co-operation), in: OSW and CSM report: Stosunki Rosja–
Niemcy w latach 1998–2005 (Russian-German relations between 1998 and 
2005), Warsaw 2006.
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of energy since more than 40% of German gas imports and more 
than 30% of its oil imports came from Russia. 
The special treatment of Russia by German politicians mainly in-
volved: (1) developing economic and political links with the Rus-
sian Federation9 with a view to engendering a change of stand-
ards in Russian politics and business; (2) exceptional tolerance 
and understanding for “Russia’s difficult situation on its road to 
modernisation and democratisation”; and (3) the recognition that 
Russia had to be part of European and global security policy ar-
rangements. 
The practical expressions of Germany’s policy towards the Rus-
sian Federation included the so-called neue Ostpolitik concept de-
veloped by the german Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2006 
(launched during the German presidency of the EU Council in the 
first half of 2007), the 2008 partnership for Modernisation ini-
tiative, and numerous cases of military co-operation between 
the two states, as well as germany’s opposition to the deploy-
ment of a missile shield in Central Europe.10 
9 The governments of the two countries also sought to develop institutional 
co-operation based primarily on annual intergovernmental consultations 
and the operation of numerous working groups tasked with solving specific 
problems in their respective fields such as for instance justice and home af-
fairs. A great role in lobbying for close German-Russian co-operation has 
been played and continues to be played by the Committee on Eastern Eu-
ropean Economic Relations (Ost-Ausschuss), which is an influential asso-
ciation of German companies investing in Eastern Europe. In its analyses, 
meetings and press conference, the committee presents Russia as an excep-
tionally attractive investment and export market with immense develop-
ment potential. On 11 July 2013 the committee’s president Eckhard Cordes 
during a press conference appealed to the German government for a “new 
policy towards Russia” and called for the results of a study commissioned by 
Ost-Ausschuss to be presented. The study discussed the concerns entrepre-
neurs have about the deteriorating climate of German-Russian relations. 
10 See: Germany in NATO’s missile defence system, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/
publikacje/analyses/2012-02-08/germany-natos-missile-defence-system
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Steinmeier’s concept of neue Ostpolitik (new Eastern policy) was 
addressed to the European Union’s neighbours to the east and, 
more broadly, Europe, and was founded on three equally im-
portant pillars that formed a comprehensive whole: strength-
ening relations with Russia, a policy towards the countries of 
Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus (the European Neigh-
bourhood Policy Plus), and a strategy towards Central Asia. The 
German Ministry of Foreign Affairs expected the three pillars 
to be complementary and to produce synergies, based on the 
crucial assumption that without russia, it would not be 
possible to solve any of the eu’s important international 
policy problems, especially in eastern europe and the cau-
casus, i.e. in the eu’s “near neighbourhood”. In reality, then, 
the entire initiative was focused on maintaining good relations 
with Russia, which automatically nudged greater involvement 
in the post-Soviet area down the agenda. The neue Ostpolitik 
concept could not be implemented fully during the German 
presidency.11 In the period in question relations between the 
European Union and Russia deteriorated as a result of a number 
of issues, including problems in energy co-operation (such as 
the impasse in the Energy Charter negotiations),12 the conflict 
11 On the other hand, the European Neighbourhood Policy Plus was partly 
implemented. It envisaged closer co-operation between the EU on the one 
hand, and the countries of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus on the 
other, and a strengthening of the eastern dimension of the European Neigh-
bourhood Policy (ENP). The objective was to ensure security and stabilise 
the situation of the EU’s eastern neighbours by supporting democratisa-
tion and economic reform in the countries covered by so called ENP Plus 
(Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as Belarus 
subject to its compliance with certain conditions). The countries were ex-
pected to strive for EU standards by adopting the acquis communautaire, 
concluding bilateral and regional sectoral agreements in areas of particular 
interest for the EU and its neighbours (including energy, communication 
and transport, environmental protection, migration). The policy also envis-
aged additional funding and “institutional participation”, i.e. the partici-
pation of partners, as observers, in the EU decision making processes, and 
institutional political dialogue in specific areas). With regard to promoting 
regional co-operation, the German Foreign Ministry’s document identified 
co-operation in the Black Sea region as a priority.
12 See the interview with Andris Piebalgs, the EU commissioner for energy 
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over the Russian embargo on Polish meat, and the treatment of 
the Russian minority in the Baltic states and the cyber-attack 
on Estonia.13 Other reasons included the unresolved controver-
sies among EU member states over the imbalance between eco-
nomic co-operation (including on energy) under the new East-
ern policy and the promotion of democracy and policies based 
on shared values. Even within the federal government, Angela 
Merkel’s Chancellor’s Office remained sceptical about the idea 
proposed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs led by her Social 
Democratic coalition partner.
From today’s perspective, the neue Ostpolitik has failed to live up 
to expectations, but its basic tenets are still worthy of attention 
because they demonstrate the long-term nature and timelessness 
of Germany’s approach to the eastern neighbourhood, including 
Russia.14 
Firstly, most of the proposals of neue Ostpolitik that aimed at 
strengthening co-operation envisaged long-term measures.
Secondly, it made the assumption that deeper economic and en-
ergy co-operation should play a special role and that bilateral 
projects should take precedence over multilateral undertakings 
so that the German taxpayer’s money was spent on ventures that 
benefited Germany. 
po licy, http://www.archiwum.wyborcza.pl/Archiwum/1,0,4874742,20070518RP-
DGW,CHCIALBYM_WIERZYC_ROSJANOM,.html;
http://biznes.interia.pl/wiadomosci/news/trudny-szczyt-ue-rosja-w-sa-
marze,911642,4199
13 For more information on the subject, see: M. Słowikowski, Stosunki unijno- 
-rosyjskie w okresie niemieckiej prezydencji (EU-Russia relations during 
the German presidency), Analizy natolińskie (Natolin Analyses) Issue 6 (19), 
2007; http://www.natolin.edu.pl/pdf/analizy/Natolin_Analiza_6_2007.pdf
14 For more information see: Germany and the Eastern Partnership, http://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2010-06-18/germany-
and-eastern-partnership 
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Thirdly, it was felt that deeper co-operation with the countries of 
Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus should not be conflated 
with a pre-accession process aimed at membership in the EU, but 
should rather be understood as something offered “instead of fu-
ture membership in the EU”, and should involve mainly deeper 
economic relations and a harmonisation of legislation. 
the partnership for Modernisation project, put forward in 
May 2008, was addressed directly to Russia. It reflected the great 
hopes that the German political class had vested in Dmitry Med-
vedev and his pledge to liberalise the economy and modernise the 
state.15 From Germany’s point of view, the Partnership formalised 
a long-term project aimed at safeguarding access to the Russian 
market, and especially the segments of services, climate protec-
tion (energy efficiency) and healthcare (medical technology) for 
Germany’s small and medium-sized businesses. Economic co-op-
eration in the energy sector (extraction, processing and transmis-
sion) was expected to generate benefits for both sides (access to 
the Russian oil and gas deposits), and the training offered to Rus-
sian lawyers and officials was intended to improve the operation 
of Russia’s public administration and promote Western standards 
(also by combatting corruption). However, the Russian side was 
only interested in transfers of German technologies and – some-
what surprisingly for the German strategists – in entering the 
German market, i.e. in actually investing in German companies.16 
The Russians unsuccessfully attempted to take over Opel (they hit 
firm opposition from the United States), and their efforts to take 
over Infineon (a producer of software, including data encryption 
software) also failed. 
15 See: http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/best/2010-03-31/bundestag-i-
rzad-rfn-zaciesnienie-wspolpracy-z-rosja
16 See: http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/tydzien-na-wschodzie/2009-06-03/
opel-w-rosyjskich-rekach; http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/tydzien-
na-wschodzie/2010-03-03/rosjanie-wspieraja-wschodnioniemieckie-stocznie
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
3/
20
14
17
In 2010 the Partnership for Modernisation became an EU-Russia 
project, but that did not improve its dynamics or infuse it with 
new content. The proposal has attracted little enthusiasm from 
Russian business and political circles, and media interest in it 
has been and remains very limited.17 That is because the Kremlin 
does not want to see Western democratic standards implemented 
in the Russian Federation and is not interested in strengthening 
democratic state institutions. At the same time, however, Russian 
politicians are always interested in transfers of EU funds for eco-
nomic or research projects in selected fields, and will continue to 
give the green light to partnership understood in this way. 
The fiasco of the Partnership for Modernisation has also been not-
ed by German politicians and experts, and even by representa-
tives of German business.18 Nonetheless, the coalition agreement 
of the new government, the third one to be led by Chancellor An-
gela Merkel, once again includes a provision on supporting and 
expanding the Partnership for Modernisation concept, which 
is certainly a gesture to the SPD and the new foreign minister, 
Frank-Walter Steinmeier, as the author of this idea. In the absence 
of any other strategy, Steinmeier will presumably pay a lot of at-
tention to filling this co-operation formula with new content, but 
it remains to be seen what that content will be. 
the efforts to develop closer german (eu) – russian co-oper-
ation in the area of security have also failed. Presenting itself 
as Russia’s advocate in the EU, in June 2008, just several days after 
17 For more information on the Russian vision see: M. Menkiszak, Greater 
Europe. Putin’s Vision of the European (Dis)integration, OSW Studies Is-
sue 46, Warsaw 2014; http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-stud-
ies/2013-10-14/greater-europe-putins-vision-european-dis-integration
18 See: http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/publikationen/kurz-gesagt/die-
deutsch-russische-modernisierungspartnerschaft-skepsis-angebracht.html
See: http://www.cducsu.de/Titel__sorge_um_modernisierungspartnerschaft_
mit_russland/TabID__6/SubTabID__7/InhaltTypID__1/InhaltID__25183/
inhalte.aspx
See: http://www.gruene-bundestag.de/?id=4385032
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the EU-Russia summit, Germany came up with a new German-
Russian project, the so-called Meseberg initiative, aimed at estab-
lishing a ministerial-level EU-Russia committee for political and 
security affairs and chaired by the Russian minister for foreign 
affairs and the EU High Representative for Foreign and Security 
Policy. The committee was supposed to work on developing rules 
for the management of civilian or military crises and put forward, 
in appropriate multilateral forums, joint EU-Russian proposals to 
resolve civilian and military conflicts and crises.19 The committee’s 
first assignment was to resolve the Transnistria conflict within 
the existing 5+2 format of negotiations.20 Germany’s partners in 
the EU, however, showed little understanding for the proposal and 
in some cases were outraged by Germany’s unilateral conduct in 
this case and the lack of consultation. The ultimate failure of the 
initiative, however, was primarily due to the fact that Russia was 
not interested in solving the Transnistrian conflict in a way that 
could lead to the entire Moldova becoming independent of Russia. 
Meanwhile, German arms companies became involved in the 
modernisation of the Russian army, seeing this as an opportu-
nity to boost the sales of their products21. According to the Joint 
19 See: http://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/doc/actualites/genshagener-pa-
piere-2011-7-eng.pdf
20 See: Germany and Russia discuss security issues, http://www.osw.waw.pl/
en/publikacje/analyses/2010-06-09/germany-and-russia-discuss-securi-
ty-issues; Russia’s superficial concession on Transnistria, http://www.osw.
waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2011-04-06/russias-superficial-conces-
sion-transnistria 
21 Germany is actively involved in the modernisation of the Russian army, 
preparing and carrying out a project to establish a state-of-the-art train-
ing facility for the Russian Land Forces – the Combat Training Centre near 
Mulino, Russia. The Bundeswehr also receives support from Russia, e.g. it 
is receiving assistance from the Russian Aerospace Defence Forces in the 
development of its orbital satellite constellation. Russia has also allowed 
the transit of German troops headed for Afghanistan via its territory. Cf.: 
Andrzej Wilk, Współpraca wojskowa Rosji i Niemiec (The Russian-German 
military co-operation), in: OSW and CSM report: Stosunki Rosja–Niemcy 
w latach 1998-2005 (Russian-German relations between 1998 and 2005), 
Warsaw 2006.
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Conference Church and Development (GKKE), which prepares an-
nual reports on German arms and military equipment exports, 
in 2010 the volume of German arms sales to Russia was not very 
high at € 144 million, out of the € 5.4 billion of total arms exports.22 
The establishment of a new-generation combat training centre in 
Mulino near Moscow is another illustration of the ambitions of 
German companies. Created by Russia in co-operation with Ger-
many (Rheinmetall Defence is the company in charge of its im-
plementation), the centre will offer comprehensive training, both 
on 3D simulators and in firing-range conditions, for a developed 
tactical unit (brigade), including a training battle between two 
brigades. As the first facility of this kind in Russia (only a handful 
of Western armies have access to similar training facilities), the 
centre will considerably change the nature and manner in which 
the Russian army trains its land units and the air force and air-
borne units co-operating with the land forces.23 
After the 2008 war in georgia, a widening gap emerged be-
tween germany’s political narrative on russia and the per-
ceptions prevalent in german business circles regarding 
russia. While economic relations continued to develop well, the 
change in the view of Russia was significant and affected ever-
wider swathes of public opinion and the political scene. While the 
aim remained, in principle, to maintain dialogue with Russia and 
build up all sorts of ties with the country, the German political 
elite clearly lost faith in the Russian leadership as a reliable and 
predictable partner, especially in the security sphere. Over time 
the idea that Russia’s power should be measured in terms of its 
potential for destruction, rather than Moscow’s willingness to 
co-operate constructively became the dominant opinion. The 
22 See: The Ministry of Defence is supporting German arms manufacturers 
abroad, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2011-09-21/min-
istry-defence-supporting-german-arms-manufacturers-abroad
23 Cf.: France and Germany are establishing a closer military co-operation 
with Russia, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2011-06-29/
france-and-germany-are-establishing-a-closer-military-co-operation
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“destructiveness” of Russia’s power became ever more evident 
and there was growing disillusionment with the policies of Presi-
dent Dmitry Medvedev who the Germans had hoped would bring 
about more liberalisation and democratisation, and would open 
Russia up to the West. Those negative perceptions were borne out 
by successive steps taken by Russia’s political leadership, includ-
ing the stance taken by Russia on matters ranging from the con-
flict over Iran’s nuclear programme to the Syrian civil war, and, 
in the internal dimension, Putin’s third term as president and his 
increasingly repressive domestic policy, including the Pussy Riot 
conviction or the Magnitsky case. 
Emboldened by the increasingly harsh reactions of German pub-
lic opinion, including the media and experts,24 to developments in 
Russia, German politicians started to express their objections to 
the direction taken by Russia ever more vocally. 
The breakthrough came with the Bundestag resolution on co-oper-
ation with Russia, proposed by Andreas Schockenhoff, a CDU dep-
uty and the German government’s plenipotentiary for German-
Russian social contacts, and adopted ahead of the most recent 
German-Russian consultations in 2012. The resolution revealed 
how the German political scene was divided on Russia. Interest-
ingly, the split did not run along party lines, but rather within the 
political forces.25 Schockenhoff was criticised for his draft (which 
24 See: http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2012A50_
stw.pdf
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/quadriga-preis-fuer-putin-prinzip-
ienlos-14971.html
http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article13490529/Quadriga-Kura-
torium-setzt-Preisverleihung-aus.html
25 Schockenhoff’s project was criticised by Philipp Missfelder, the Christian 
Democrats’ spokesperson for foreign policy, Karl-Georg Wellmann (CDU), 
and Peter Gauweiler (CSU) among others. It was backed by Ruprecht Polenz, 
chair of the Bundestag Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the former min-
ister for Environment Norbert Röttgen. See: http://www.spiegel.de/poli-
tik/deutschland/merkel-streitet-mit-putin-um-russlandsbeauftragten-
schockenhoff-a-862850.html
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contained a damning assessment of the Kremlin’s actions) by 
some of the SPD’s and the Green’s deputies, and by his own coali-
tion partners from the CDU/CSU and the FDP, who accused him 
of provoking unnecessary conflicts. The German Ministry of For-
eign Affairs edited the text to mitigate its provisions, but Chancel-
lor Merkel backed Schockenhoff, arguing that well-founded criti-
cism was not slander. 
Speaking of the differences of views among the political players 
in Germany regarding co-operation with Russia it is worth noting 
the foreign policy concept proposed by the newly established Eu-
rosceptic party, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), ahead of 
the parliamentary elections in September 2013. The party was cre-
ated by German intellectuals, economists and professors.26 While 
it fell short of the Bundestag electoral threshold by a very narrow 
margin in the parliamentary elections, it has a good chance of 
succeeding in the elections to the European Parliament in 2014. 
This provides an interesting example of a certain mode of think-
ing about the role of Germany in Europe and its relation to Russia 
which still prevails in conservative circles. Referring to the post-
Soviet area, the AfD has recommended far-reaching accommoda-
tion of Russian interests, quoting factors such as the traditional 
ties between Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia and Moldova on the one 
hand and Moscow on the other (“Separating [those countries from 
Russia] would be comparable only to separating Aachen or Köln 
from Germany”27). According to the AfD, Germany and Europe 
During the debate on the resolution in the Bundestag, Schockenhoff along 
with the head of the SPD caucus Gernot Erler and the Green Party deputy 
Marieluise Beck accused the Russian government of pursuing a confronta-
tional line against the opposition. In the end, none of the opposition forces 
in parliament backed the resolution: the Greens believed it could be formu-
lated in even stronger terms, while the SPD and Die Linke considered its 
wording to be too harsh.
26 See: German Euro-sceptics to establish a political party, http://www.osw.
waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-04-10/german-euro-sceptics-to-es-
tablish-a-political-party 
27 https://www.alternativefuer.de/2013/09/11/thesenpapier-aussenpolitik/
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have no interest in weakening Russia and the entire post-Soviet 
area. The party also highlights “Russia’s role as the constructive 
godfather in German history, who saved Prussia from failure. 
This concerns the year 1763, the 1806–1807 period, 1813, Bismarck’s 
unification in 1866–1870 and German reunification in 1990–1991.” 
The AfD also refers directly to Bismarck’s legacy in Russian pol-
icy, which, according to the party, would be a desirable course to 
take; while at the same time emphasising that in the context of 
Poland having joined NATO and the EU, such a course could not be 
interpreted as anti-Polish. 
As the relations between Berlin and Moscow have noticeably 
worsened, the permanent sticking points in mutual co-operation 
have begun to surface ever more frequently and visibly. That is 
because, despite the exceptional nature of relations, Germany 
had not changed its position on issues such as the abolition of the 
visa regime – which is a priority for the Russian side in the ne-
gotiations with the EU. Despite the fact that the Russian propos-
als have been backed by German business28 and that the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs has to some extent supported the liberalisation 
of the visa regime and the introduction of visa facilitations, the 
German Interior Ministry has remained sceptical and focused on 
ensuring internal security as its main priority.29 On 30 July 2013 
the Süddeutsche Zeitung reported that the Chancellor’s Office, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Interior Ministry had agreed 
a joint position, subsequently presented to the European Com-
28 Die Visa-Pflicht bremst Geschäftsmöglichkeiten aus und verursacht zu-
dem in Europa jährlich Bürokratiekosten in Höhe von einer Milliarde Euro, 
http://www.euractiv.de/globales-europa/artikel/deutsche-wirtschaft-
fordert-neue-russland-politik-007757
29 In the summer of 2012, in connection with a courtcase in Britain involving 
two oligarchs, Oleg Deripaska and Mikhail Chernoy, Deripaska’s attorneys 
presented written testimony by August Henning, the former chief of BND, 
the German counter-intelligence service, who discussed the immense prob-
lems faced by the German security apparatus in fighting Russian organised 
crime in Germany and the problems with the witness protection system in 
such cases. Cf.: Markus Dettmer, Matthias Schepp, Zeuge des Oligarchen, 
Der Spiegel 24/2013, http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-97110525.html
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mission, which stated that abolishing the visa regime would be 
premature, especially for the holders of service passports, i.e. 
the category of travellers in the case of whom visa liberalisation 
was particularly important for the Kremlin.30 The provision on 
visas in the new coalition agreement concluded in 2013 may lead 
to a change in this position; in the agreement, the ruling parties 
have for the first time declared that their objective would be to 
liberalise the visa regime for entrepreneurs, researchers, civil so-
ciety representatives and students.
Another unresolved issue concerns the restitution of German 
cultural assets that have been kept in Russia since World War II. 
After Germany was defeated in 1945, a special Soviet commission 
confiscated the works of art stolen by the Reich in many Europe-
an countries, especially those that were in East Germany at that 
time. In the 1950s, many of them were returned to East Germany, 
but around 200,000 cultural artefacts are still in Russia. Those 
works of art have been the object of a dispute between Germany 
and Russia for over twenty years. In 1998 the Russians concluded 
that the confiscation had been legal as compensation for damages 
sustained during the war. They have also at times raised the ar-
gument that the Germans have been withholding information on 
the whereabouts in Germany of some of the works of art stolen 
from Soviet territory. The Germans, on the other hand, have been 
invoking the provisions of the 1907 Hague Convention on respect-
ing the laws and customs of war and the 1990 German-Russian 
co-operation agreement, claiming that cultural assets should be 
returned on that basis. No compromise seems likely to found in 
the immediate future.31 
30 Daniel Broessler, Berlin bremst bei Erleichterungen für Russlands Be-
amte, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 30.06.2013, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/vi-
sa-debatte-berlin-bremst-bei-erleichterungen-fuer-russlands-beamte-1.1733991
31 For more information see the interview with the German historian Wolfgang 
Eichwede for n-tv.de, 21.06.2013, http://www.n-tv.de/politik/Deutschland-
wird-Abschied-nehmen-muessen-article10867126.html
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In conclusion, it can be said that the dominant sentiment in 
germany has been that of fatigue and frustration caused by 
the absence of any tangible results of the country’s policy to-
wards russia so far. In dealing with Putin’s Russia, Berlin lacks 
an idea and a broader concept that would go beyond economic re-
lations (although it is notable that the 2013 coalition agreement no 
longer includes the provision on developing an “energy partner-
ship” with Russia, which was present in the two previous agree-
ments). Moreover, since Germany’s foreign policy is de facto run 
by the Chancellor’s Office, the actions and initiatives of the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs such as the Kaliningrad Triangle32 should 
be seen as merely tactical moves aimed at building confidence 
and providing positive examples of concrete co-operation. Their 
reach, though, should be limited and regional (to the Kaliningrad 
Oblast in this case). However, as Frank-Walter Steinmeier takes 
the post of foreign minister again, Chancellor Merkel and her ad-
visors will presumably be more inclined to take into account the 
Foreign Ministry’s opinions on eastern policy issues. Nonethe-
less, the change of rhetoric that will most likely be implemented 
by the Social Democratic leadership of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs will not considerably alter the substance of Germany’s ap-
proach to the Russian political elite. This is due to the fact that 
it has been an increasingly common attitude among the current 
German leadership to do little and wait for a change of leadership 
in the Kremlin. This is even more the case since Vladimir Putin 
interprets any decisions taken by Angela Merkel that affect Rus-
sian interests as being targeted against his political backing and 
himself personally. This was the case with the measures taken to 
save Cyprus from financial collapse by tapping deposits held by 
Cypriot banks (a large proportion of which belonged to Russian 
32 For more information on this initiative, see the article by Stanisław Bieleń: 
Trialog niemiecko-polsko-rosyjski, czyli o idei „Trójkąta Kaliningradz-
kiego” (German-Polish-Russian trialogue, or the Kaliningrad Triangle con-
cept), in: Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny (Polish Diplomatic Review), Issue 
2/2012, http://www.pism.pl/publikacje/czasopisma/Polski_Przeglad_Dy-
plomatyczny/2012/2#
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nationals and companies),33 or the support expressed by German 
politicians to the Ukrainian protesters in Kyiv after President 
Yanukovych chose not to sign the association agreement be-
tween the EU and Ukraine. The decision of the German president 
Joachim Gauck to boycott the Winter Olympics in Sochi was also 
widely commented on.34 
Main provisions of the coalition agreement signed on 
27.11.2013 concerning relations with russia, entitled  
“open dialogue and broad co-operation with russia”  
•	 The agreement recognises that close historical ties exist be-
tween Germany and Russia and that Russia is the European 
Union's largest and most important neighbour; it also states 
that a modern, economically strong and democratic Russia 
is in the interests of Germany and Europe.
•	 It announces an extension of the Partnership for Moderni-
sation and envisages a debate on different forms of the part-
nership.
•	 It states Germany’s recognition of the various efforts 
aimed at deepening and widening contacts at the level of 
state institutions and of citizens. It provides that those 
contacts will continue to be supported, including through 
33 See: Germany’s ‘Cyprus victory’?, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
analyses/2013-03-27/germanys-cyprus-victory 
34 Gauck’s critical attitude towards Putin’s policy has been evident since 2012, 
i.e. since the beginning of his term as president of Germany. Gauck has paid 
no official visit to Russia thus far, and the Russian side cancelled the official 
opening ceremony of the German Year in Moscow in the summer of 2012, in 
which both presidents were expected to take part. Gauck dealt out particu-
larly harsh criticism of the Russian government when meeting Russian in-
tellectuals in Berlin in June 2013 – on that occasion he spoke about the short-
comings in the rule of law in Russia and the difficulties faced by sections of 
the media critical of the Kremlin, as well as some imperialistic aspects of 
Russia’s policy. He raised similar arguments to criticise Russia during his 
visit to the Baltic states in July 2013. 
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the Petersburg Dialogue formula. It announces that new 
forms of people-to-people dialogue with Russia will be es-
tablished, including contacts with representatives of the 
new middle class and civil society.
•	 The agreement also calls for the standards of the rule of law 
and democracy to be upheld in contacts with civil society, 
the political opposition and minorities, and for the commit-
ments adopted within the WTO framework to be respected.
•	 It announces that Germany will seek a liberalisation of the 
visa regime for entrepreneurs, researchers, civil society 
representatives, and students, and that it will strive to boost 
its own analytic capacity with regard to Russia and Eastern 
Europe.
•	 It provides that Germany will act to ensure greater coherence 
of the EU’s policy on Russia (this refers, inter alia, to a new 
partnership agreement with Russia, development of co-op-
eration in the Baltic Sea region and deeper co-operation on 
foreign and security policy). In this context, Germany recog-
nises the important role the dialogue between Germany, Po-
land and Russia plays, and speaks of taking Poland’s interests 
into account in bilateral relations with Russia.
•	 Finally, the agreement recognises that security in Europe 
can only be ensured with Russia, and not against Russia, and 
that for this reason Germany will seek to co-operate more 
closely with Russia in regulating conflicts in the shared 
neighbourhood, and expects progress in this respect, espe-
cially with regard to Transnistria.
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II. dIFFerent prIorItIeS –  
gerMAnY’S MultI-Vector polIcY 
germany’s present attitude towards the russian Federation 
has also been affected by factors which go beyond the two 
countries’ bilateral relations. one of them concerns ger-
many’s growing political and economic importance, as was 
fulsomely revealed as the european union’s financial crisis 
unfolded. Another is the fact that the german political and 
economic elite view globalisation as an opportunity to boost 
germany’s economic development, rather than a source of 
threats, and formulates its strategic approaches and policy 
planning accordingly.35 By prioritising the countries re-
ferred to as new regional powers (neue Gestaltungsmächte) 
and treating them as important partners in their own right 
germany hopes not only to gain access to new markets, but 
also to create a co-operation network with those countries to 
jointly influence the new global economic and political order. 
At the same time, due to germany’s strong position within 
the eu, its partners also see it as kind of new european Ge-
staltungsmacht. 
Finally, the launch of negotiations for a free trade agreement 
between the eu and the uS (ttIp) will offer germany the 
chance to also strengthen the trans-Atlantic direction of its 
exports and investments.36
35 For more information, see: K. Popławski, Chasing globalisation. Germany’s 
economic relations with the BRIC countries, OSW Report, Warsaw 2013, 
http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-report/2013-11-25/chasing-glo-
balisation-germanys-economic-relations-bric-countries
36 Studies by German research centres show that in the long term, Germany 
will gain an extra 4.7% of GDP growth as a result of an increase in the vol-
ume of foreign trade. The agreement is expected to generate 180,000 new 
jobs in Germany. See: Germany-USA: a pragmatic partnership http://www.
osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-06-19/germany-usa-a-pragmatic-
partnership
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In view of those changes, russia, while remaining a very im-
portant non-eu market for german goods, has been losing 
its relative significance as germany opens up to the global 
markets. 
Germany’s European policy, which is widely seen as part of the 
country’s internal policy, has been focused in recent years on sav-
ing and consolidating the eurozone. Preserving the stability of 
the EU’s economic and financial system remains a strategic objec-
tive for Berlin because this system allows Germany to maintain 
its current rate of economic development and makes it the most 
powerful state in the EU.37 The German economic model still re-
lies heavily on exports, which help generate a large trade surplus. 
This is especially the case now during a crisis which has affect-
ed the other EU economies much more severely38 but which has 
a positive impact on Germany’s GDP, keeps the budget deficit low 
and boosts the demand for Germany’s treasury bonds. Germany is 
37 Germany’s new pragmatism in European policy is about making the sys-
tem’s stability a top priority. This is visible in Berlin’s efforts to push 
through such projects as the Fiscal Pact or the Banking Union. Germany’s 
objective is to streamline the decision-making process in the EU, or at least 
in the eurozone. However, many representatives of the intellectual elite of 
Germany (and not only Germany) have been accusing the German leader-
ship of having lost patience with the democratic system and of casting doubt 
on the efficiency of democracy in coping with economic competition from 
countries such as China or Russia. Simultaneously, enormously important 
debates have been taking place on the relation between values such as order 
and stability on the one hand, and freedom on the other. 
A debate that followed the text by Joerg Lau of Die Zeit has been ongoing for 
several months see: http://blog.zeit.de/joerglau/2013/02/21/schurken-die-
wir-brauchen_5889; http://www.natolin.edu.pl/pdf/nowa_europa/NE12_
spis_tresci.pdf
38 In 2012, Germany exported € 1.1 trillion worth of commodities, while its im-
ports were worth € 909 billion. Exports accounted for 41.5% of the country’s 
GDP, which was one of the highest percentages among large countries. Its 
trade surplus accounted for more than 7% of GDP and increased threefold in 
the years 2000–2012, from € 60 billion to € 190 billion. Out of it, the surplus 
in trade with the other EU countries accounted for € 116 billion. Germany’s 
treasury bonds have reported record-low yields for the last several years 
– as a result the country’s debt servicing costs have been low, and in 2012, 
Germany reported a budget surplus of 0.2% of GDP. 
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currently the strongest economy in the EU and the fourth strong-
est in the world. The rise of Germany’s economic and political 
power in the European Union has strengthened its position on 
the international arena and consolidated its image as the leader 
of the EU.39 This offered Berlin an opportunity to intensify rela-
tions, both bilaterally and at the European level, with those part-
ners whom the German political leadership and German business 
identified as offering the best prospects and being most important 
for the German economy. These include the countries referred to 
as the new regional powers, or neue Gestaltungsmächte. 
For Germany, with its scarcity of natural resources, the contrac-
tion of global raw materials reserves poses one the most impor-
tant political problems, as the country has to buy oil and other 
raw materials necessary for its economy from other countries. 
In 2012 Germany imported € 118.9 billion worth of natural re-
sources, and out of this number, mineral resources accounted for 
€ 104.1 billion. The German state has been paying a lot of attention 
to actions aimed at averting a shortage of raw materials. The Ger-
man minister for economy in the autumn of 2010, called for a Re-
sources Agency to be established to support business in seeking 
access to natural resources, and in October 2010, the government 
developed and adopted a national raw materials strategy. Promot-
ing the German economy’s access to natural resources is also one 
of the main elements of the newest policy concept adopted by the 
German Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2012, i.e. the strategy on 
39 Germany was the only EU country to be visited by China’s head of govern-
ment Li Keqiang during his first foreign visit on 26 May 2013, and one year 
earlier, during a visit to China (1–3 February 2012), the German chancellor, 
speaking as a de facto EU envoy, made attempts at persuading the govern-
ment of China to become involved in the effort to support the faltering Eu-
rozone. Moreover, it is actually not possible to make any decisions within 
the EU without Germany’s consent: the EU’s failure to impose stricter CO2 
emissions limits for cars as a result of Germany’s objections is a case in 
point. See: Merkel gegen alle: Neue CO2-Grenzwerte für Autos “schurken-
haft” blockiert, http://www.euractiv.de/energie-und-klimaschutz/artikel/
merkel-gegen-alle-neue-co2-abgas-grenzwerte-fuer-autos-schurkenhaft-
blockiert-007803?newsletter 
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the new regional powers including Turkey, South Korea, Indone-
sia, Brazil or Mexico (Russia is viewed in this context as an old 
power, or alte Gestaltungsmacht, with which extensive co-opera-
tion already exists). Those two strategies have been adopted and 
are already being implemented by the German government and 
illustrate the direction of the shift in Germany’s foreign policy.
The German government’s 2010 strategy concerns the supply of 
mineral resources, including rare earth metals. The document 
identifies the scarcity of natural resources needed by the German 
economy as a problem40 and proposes solutions (including govern-
ment guarantees for investments aimed at providing resources, 
support of German diplomacy and politics for international pro-
jects focused on resources, and the development of partnerships 
with countries that possess large reserves of natural resources). 
Under this strategy, the Germans have already managed to con-
clude resource partnerships with Mongolia and Kazakhstan.41 
the strategy on the major new regional powers provides for 
the development of deeper co-operation with those countries and 
for a co-ordination of the activities of the various German minis-
tries that concern them, the aim being to generate synergies and 
to ensure greater coherence. Germany’s objective is not only to 
expand into new markets and gain access to natural resources, 
but also, to create a network of co-dependencies with the new re-
gional powers in order to influence the new global economic and 
political order in conjunction with them.42
40 For more information, see: http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/komen-
tarze-osw/2011-02-08/deficyt-surowcow-naturalnych-implikacje-dla-nie-
mieckiej-polityk
41 See: Germany is consistently implementing its strategy of raw material 
partnerships, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-02-06/
germany-consistently-implementing-its-strategy-raw-material
42 See: The German concept for increasing the economic benefits of globalisa-
tion, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2012-02-29/german-
concept-increasing-economic-benefits-globalisation
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This focus on the neue Gestaltungsmächte has proved beneficial for 
Germany already in the current EU crisis. Germany has been able 
to make up for the decline in exports to EU member states due 
to the strategic actions taken by the German government with 
a view to diversifying exports markets by expanding to, inter 
alia the BRIC countries (i.e. including, but not limited to, Russia), 
where Germany is currently the third biggest exporter of com-
modities. In the years 2000–2011 the proportion of trade with the 
BRIC countries in Germany’s total foreign trade increased from 
5.5% to 13.3%, while the proportion of exports to the EU decreased 
slightly over the same period (from 59.4% to 56.3% in 2011). The 
growth dynamics of Germany’s economic relations with China 
in particular has been remarkable. In the period in question, it 
managed to increase its share of EU exports in the Chinese market 
from 35.6% to 47.5% (and its share in the Indian market increased 
from 17.9% to 26.9%).43
The above tendencies show how the shape of Germany’s foreign 
and security policy has been changing to take advantage of the op-
portunities offered by globalisation. The rise of pragmatism and 
the focus on German interests are visible both in the change of 
the main actors in charge of formulating those policies (as a result 
of the rising importance of sectoral policies), and in the direction 
of changes (Germany’s has been increasingly willing to develop 
closer political relations with China, Brazil and India due to the 
growing potential of those countries, and is reacting in a similar 
way to other countries it regards as being neue Gestaltungsmächte). 
The immense influence that German exporters have on Germa-
ny’s foreign and security policy has always been a factor, but the 
role of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs has diminished 
recently. Individual ministries have started to play a key role in 
shaping Germany’s foreign and security policy, and this situation 
has bolstered the already strong position of the Chancellor’s Office 
and Angela Merkel personally – not only as the actor formulating 
43 Cf.: K. Popławski, Chasing globalisation, op. cit.
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those policies, but also as a mediator and the highest instance in 
disputes between different ministries. Wolfgang Schäuble and his 
Finance Ministry, which have been de facto deciding Germany’s 
European policy, has also been playing an immense role in this 
context as has the Ministry of Defence, which is in charge of Ger-
many’s security strategies. Finally, the Ministry of Economics and 
the Ministry of Economic Co-operation and Development have 
also been shaping Germany’s foreign policy. These two ministries 
will be implementing the crucially important strategies of Ger-
many’s foreign economic policy that have been discussed above, 
especially in the area of the raw materials policy. In both strate-
gies Russia is merely one of several potential areas of interest for 
Germany’s politics and business.
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III. BuSIneSS IS doIng FIne
despite the many difficulties experienced by german compa-
nies in the russian market, trade between the two countries 
has been thriving, and trade turnover has reached record lev-
els of around € 80 billion a year. however, investments in the 
russian market are much riskier than in the other BrIc coun-
tries, and the resulting outflow of capital from russia has been 
a source of great concern for the Kremlin.44 In view of the dy-
namic changes in the direction of germany’s exports, and espe-
cially its focus on china, russia may lose its status as a country 
with special relations, especially since even the political back-
ing that co-operation with russia has enjoyed in germany has 
not considerably improved the position of german exporters in 
relation to other eu states over the last decade: germany’s share 
in eu exports to russia has increased only slightly from 30.2% to 
31.8%.45 trade with the new regional powers has the potential to 
increase much faster than trade with russia, and russian raw 
materials imports to germany, especially imports of energy re-
sources, may be losing importance for germany as a result of its 
ongoing energy transformation. 
Still in 2010, German experts argued that – precisely because of 
the raw materials issue – Germany’s priority should continue to 
be close co-operation with Russia to bind it with Europe, even 
at the price of having to adjust some elements of the European 
security architecture.46 The same experts also recommended 
44 The net outflow of capital from Russia increased more than twofold in 2011, 
from € 27 billion to € 60 billion; cf.: http://www.ost-ausschuss.de/print/122, 
According to Russian data, capital outflow in 2012 amounted to US$ 58.6 bil-
lion, and in the first half of 2013 – € 38.4 billion. 
See also: http://www.obserwatorfinansowy.pl/forma/analizy/co-do-rosji-
z-ropy-wplynie-kapitalem-wycieka
45 Cf.: K. Popławski, Chasing globalisation, op. cit.
46 Bundeswehr Transformation Centre, Peak Oil: Security policy implications of 
scarce resources, p. 92: “Moscow should be given the option of pursuing a dif-
ferentiating external energy policy towards EU countries, if the alterna-
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creating multiple co-dependencies between raw materials sup-
pliers and importers (e.g. within the framework of the German-
Russian, and subsequently EU-Russian, Partnership for Mod-
ernisation programme) and strengthening ties, especially at the 
level of corporations (as in the case of the Nord Stream gas pipe-
line or Rosneft47). Thinking about Russia in this way is justified if 
one takes into account the fact that Germany is the single largest 
buyer of Russian gas.48 In 2012, oil and gas accounted for 74% of 
Germany’s imports, while metals constituted 8% of imports, and 
heating oil and coke another 8%, and coal a further 2%. Russia 
accounts for 38% of Germany’s oil imports. In 2012, 31% of Ger-
man gas imports originated from the Russian Federation, and 
Russia’s share in Germany’s gas market had risen by 1 percent-
age point over ten years. Russia is also an important supplier of 
coal – it accounts for 24% of German coal imports (making Russia 
the second largest coal provider after the USA). However, while 
there is a widespread perception that Russia is Germany’s most 
important supplier of energy resources, it should also be noted 
that German politicians have for a long time sought as wide as 
possible a diversification of the sources of energy supplies and 
transport routes.49 Similarly, German companies, backed politi-
cally and financially by the German government have been and 
are still making intensive efforts to ensure a diversified struc-
ture of gas supplies. Those efforts gained particular momentum 
tive for Germany were a potential deterioration of bilateral relations”. See:. 
http://www.energybulletin.net/sites/default/files/Peak%20Oil_Study%20
EN.pdf; 
http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2012A30_
dickel_wep.pdf
47 See: Rosneft entering the German oil market, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/
publikacje/analyses/2010-10-20/rosneft-entering-german-oil-market
48 Gas is supplied under agreements with E.ON Ruhrgas AG, WIEH GmbH & 
Co KG and WINGAS GmbH (subsidiaries of Gazprom and the German BASF 
corporation).
49 For more information see: http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/komen-
tarze-osw/2009-08-28/polityka-gazowa-niemiec-nie-tylko-rosja
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after the war in Georgia and in the aftermath of Russia’s gas con-
flicts with Belarus and Ukraine.50
Finally, the energy transformation (Energiewende) which Ger-
many has been implementing since 2011 is expected to reduce the 
country’s dependence on energy imports. The cornerstones of this 
strategy include the development of renewable energy and a com-
plete phasing out of nuclear energy, which has already affected 
German-Russian co-operation as Siemens has withdrawn from 
co-operation with Rosatom in the nuclear sector51 and Germany 
showed no interest in buying electricity from the nuclear power 
station that Rosatom was planning to build in Kaliningrad, which 
was one of the reasons this investment was put on hold.52
The share of renewable energy in Germany’s energy production is set 
to increase systematically – from more than 20% at present to around 
38% in 2020. In 2030 it is expected to reach around 50%, in 2040 65%, 
and in 2050 as much as 80%. However, the implementation of the 
Energiewende has been stumbling on a major obstacle, i.e. the re-
luctance of German energy companies to invest in new conventional 
power plants, especially gas fired power plants, which are necessary 
50 For example, in late 2008 a letter of intent concerning a planned energy part-
nership was signed by representatives of the governments of Germany and 
Nigeria. Under this document, in 2014 Nigeria will start to supply liquefied 
gas to Germany. The German federal minister for economy at that time put 
forward a proposal to create strategic state reserves of natural gas, and the 
German government adopted a draft amendment to the law on the activities 
of foreign companies in strategic sectors of the economy, which would allow 
the government to annul takeovers of German businesses by foreign compa-
nies in cases where public order or the country’s security were put at risk. 
51 See: Siemens and Rosatom will co-operate at any cost, http://www.osw.
waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2010-06-09/siemens-and-rosatom-will-
co-operate-any-cost 
Gerrit Wiesmann, Siemens drops Rosatom nuclear plant ambitions, Finan-
cial Times, 18.09.2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2e711fde-e1e9-11e0-
9915-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2aWT5YSvY
52 For more information, see: Russia freezes the construction of the nuclear 
power plant in Kaliningrad, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analy-
ses/2013-06-12/russia-freezes-construction-nuclear-power-plant-kaliningrad
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to back up the operation of renewable energy producers53 (accord-
ing to the government’s scenarios for the implementation of the En-
ergiewende, the capacity of gas-fired power plants would need to in-
crease by 20% to 2023 if renewable capacity expands fast).54 Gazprom 
(followed by other Russian companies such as e.g. Novatek) has been 
trying to take advantage of this situation from the very beginning – 
Gazprom has direct access to the raw material, for instance from Nord 
Stream gas pipeline, and aims to build a presence in Germany’s elec-
tricity production sector. Both Gazprom and the Russian government 
have been seeking to expand Nord Stream by adding a third, or even 
a fourth branch, but the German government’s attitude towards the 
proposal has been reserved55 – Berlin expressed scepticism about it 
e.g. during the intergovernmental consultations in 2011. Another fac-
tor that has made it difficult for Germany to accept Russia’s proposal 
concerns the relatively high price of gas in comparison to the low 
prices of coal in the European market as a result of the shale gas revo-
lution in the United States. The prices of Russian gas are unattractive 
also because of the provisions of the long-term contracts concluded 
by German companies with Gazprom. Germany’s E.ON sees co-opera-
tion with Gazprom as strategically important (the two companies are 
bound by a long-term contract that runs to 2036, and E.ON has as 25% 
stake in the Yuzhno-Russkoye gas field in Siberia and a 15.5% stake 
in the Nord Stream gas pipeline) and in 2012, following a long battle 
waged over several years inter alia in front of an arbitration court in 
Stockholm it, negotiated a gas price reduction of 7–10%, effective as of 
53 See: Germany’s energy transformation: difficult beginnings, http://www.
osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-report/2012-12-06/germanys-energy-trans-
formation-difficult-beginnings
54 Cf.: K. Popławski, Economic background and the situation in the en-
ergy sector, in: Germany’s energy transformation: difficult beginnings, 
A. Kwiatkowska-Drożdż (ed.), Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw 2012, 
p. 59, http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/Niemiecka_transformacja_
energetyczna_trudne_poczatki.pdf 
55 Chancellor Merkel’s most favourable opinion on the project was spelt out 
in a statement in which she said that she saw no obstacles, “as long as the 
project was economically viable”.
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the 4th quarter of 2010.56 E.ON’s long-term strategy also provides for 
investments in green technologies and bigger purchases of gas at low-
er prices in spot markets. According to the company’s management, 
buying gas from Russia is also part of this strategy, but it should be 
done on better terms than to date. The German media have reported 
that E.ON even considered terminating its contract with Gazprom for 
gas supplies in the periods of 10 and 20 years. The company’s repre-
sentatives denied this, but it is clear that the company’s current policy 
is part of an effort to put pressure on Gazprom to lower its prices. In 
June 2013 E.ON, acting through its subsidiary, E.ON Global Commodi-
ties, signed an agreement for the supply of 6.5 billion m3 of LNG a year 
for 20 years starting in 2020 with the Canadian company Pieridae En-
ergy.57 On 9 October 2013 E.ON signed a contract with the Qatari com-
pany Qatargas for the supply of LNG. Under this contract gas will be 
delivered to the GATE LNG terminal co-owned by E.ON in the port of 
Rotterdam. The agreement, which provides for the supply of a maxi-
mum of 10 billion m3 of LNG, was concluded for a period of five years, 
and the supplies are set to begin in 2014.58
RWE, Germany’s second largest energy company, is also bound by 
a long-term contract with Gazprom for the supply of gas to 2035. 
RWE, too, has been involved in a dispute with the Russian monop-
oly, which, since the parties had failed to reach an agreement, was 
settled in June 2013 by a court of arbitration. The court accepted 
RWE’s appeal against the provisions on price setting in the long-
term contract, ordered Gazprom to repay the amounts charged 
unduly since May 2010, and ordered the company to correct the 
price-setting formula by including adjustment to market prices so 
as to reflect the market conditions as of May 2010.59 
56 The settlement was concluded outside arbitration.
57 See: http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/best/2013-06-12/historyczny-
kontrakt-eonu-na-dostawy-gazu-z-kanady
58 See: E.ON unterzeichnet Mittelfrist-LNG-Liefervertrag mit Qatargas, 
http://www.eon.com/de/presse/news/pressemitteilungen/2013/10/9/eon-
unterzeichnet-mittelfrist-lng-liefervertrag-mit-qatargas.html
59 Even earlier, in October 2012, the arbitration court in Vienna ruled in a dis-
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The fiasco of the Partnership for Modernisation, as it was con-
ceived by Germany, does not mean that trade or German invest-
ment in Russia are stagnating.60 However, it is the large compa-
nies that are reaping most of the benefits, and not the small and 
medium-sized entities whose efforts are stymied by rampant cor-
ruption and bureaucracy in Russia. The Committee on Eastern 
European Economic Relations (Ost-Ausschuss) has been continu-
ally calling for the development of economic relations which go 
beyond the energy sector. While establishing a lasting energy and 
raw materials partnership is certainly a priority, Germany see 
Russia’s need to modernise its state and economy as an opportu-
nity to create investment and technological ties between the two 
countries’ economies. Ost-Ausschuss has been actively promoting 
the involvement of German partners in such innovative projects 
as the Skolkovo Innovation Centre or the automotive plants in the 
Samara region61 and has been seeking contracts related to the or-
ganisation of sports events in Russia (e.g. the Olympic Games in 
Sochi in 2014 or the Football World Cup in 2018).62 
Around 6,500 German companies are in operation in Russia. Ac-
cording to various estimates, around 300,000 jobs in Germany 
pute concerning the re-negotiation of an agreement for the import of gas to 
the Czech market that RWE Transgas had the right to re-export the gas it 
was buying it under a contract with Gazprom to the Czech Republic.
60 Germans hope that Russia’s accession to the WTO in August 2012 will gen-
erate an additional boost. This is far from certain, however, because Rus-
sia’s accession to the WTO does not automatically liberalise general access 
to the Russian market and the implementation of individual specific provi-
sions of the accession agreement has already stumbled on difficulties. Cf.: 
Russia is a WTO member, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analy-
ses/2012-07-25/russia-a-wto-member 
61 For more information see: https://www.deutschland.de/de/topic/wirtschaft/
globalisierung-welthandel/neues-bosch-werk-in-samara;
http://www.kooperation-international.de/clusterportal/cluster-samara-
togliatti.html;
http://www.kooperation-international.de/clusterportal/cluster-skolkovo-
selenograd-moskau.html#c8409
62 Source: http://www.ost-ausschuss.de/print/122
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are dependent on trade with Russia.63 Aggregated German invest-
ments in Russia totalled € 22.2 billion in 2011, including € 8.8 bil-
lion of direct investments. Germany has thus become the fourth-
largest investor in Russia after the Netherlands, Cyprus and 
Luxembourg. In 2010–2011, Germany’s trade with Russia recov-
ered dynamically after a 38% slump in trade turnover in 2009. In 
that period, German companies exported € 34.5 billion worth of 
goods to Russia (an increase of 31%), and Germany bought € 40.9 
billion worth of goods from Russia (an increase of 28%). In 2012, 
German commodity exports to Russia were worth € 38 billion (an 
increase of 10% on 2011 figures), and Germany imported € 42.5 bil-
lion worth of goods from Russia (an increase of 4% on 2011 figures). 
However, Germany has lost its position as Russia’s top trading 
partner, dropping to the second position after China. 
Most important emerging markets for germany, by value 
of exports in 2012 (€ billion)
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Source: Proprietary calculations on the basis of data from the Federal Statisti-
cal Office of Germany.
63 Source: http://www.ost-ausschuss.de/russland 
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At present, the attitude of German politicians and business peo-
ple regarding the development of German-Russian economic re-
lations is best described as frustration at lost opportunities and 
wasted potential. Russia’s decision to forgo deeper structural re-
forms, its failure to prevent its economy from becoming increas-
ingly dependent on the raw-materials sector, rampant corruption, 
bureaucracy, and the absence of a reliable legislation and judici-
ary all hinder the involvement of German companies in the Rus-
sian market or could even make it impossible altogether. It has 
been speculated that this harms not only the German businesses 
concerned, but also the development of the Russian economy. Of 
course Germany will not give up its efforts to build economic ties 
with Russia but its energy transformation and the emergence of 
new interesting markets for German companies will push Russia 
further down the road to the position of being just one of many po-
tential partners for co-operation. As a result, Germany’s position 
in negotiations with Russia, both on economic and on political is-
sues, may become less and less accommodating (to the detriment 
of Russia). In fact, the Russian political elite views the actions 
of Germany (or the entire EU, which are anyway interpreted in 
Russia as being orchestrated by Germany) as deliberate attacks 
on Russia’s economic interests. This was the case with Germany’s 
tough position on the principles of EU-Russian energy co-opera-
tion64 or its support for Ukraine’s pro-European line, or, more re-
cently, the capital controls from Cyprus which caused the hold-
ers of deposits larger than € 100,000 in the main Cypriot banks 
to lose up to 50% or up to 80% of their money (depending on the 
bank). The Cyprus deal was a blow to some of the Russian capital 
there. Russia had previously been able to count on Berlin’s support 
also in business matters, as long as German interests were not af-
fected: Germany’s protest in April 2009 against a project of EU-
Ukrainian gas co-operation that would exclude Russia is a case in 
64 Russia’s attempts to force the EU to change its laws (concerning, inter alia, 
so-called “unbundling”) adopted with a view to creating a single, liberalised 
market in natural gas and electricity.
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point. Berlin threatened to object to funding from EU and interna-
tional financial institutions being granted for the modernisation 
of Ukraine’s gas pipeline networks unless the EU-Ukraine agree-
ment took the interests of Russia as the supplier of gas into ac-
count, arguing that the modernisation of Ukrainian gas pipelines 
was possible only with the involvement of Russia.65
65 In March 2009, a joint declaration on financial assistance for the moderni-
sation of Ukraine’s transit gas pipelines was signed in Brussels between the 
government of Ukraine, representatives of the European Commission (the 
commissioner for enlargement and energy), the World Bank, the EBRD and 
the European Investment Bank. In return, Ukraine was expected to reform 
its gas sector in line with EU rules. The reform was never launched. In May 
2013 EU commissioner Günther Oettinger still believed the modernisation 
of Ukraine’s networks to be “fundamental”; http://www.neurope.eu/arti-
cle/oettinger-sees-win-win-win-plan-ukrainian-pipeline
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concluSIonS: 
gerMAnY lAcKS A concept For ruSSIA
Germany does not have an idea of how it should continue its co-
operation with Russia, especially in the political and security 
spheres. Economic ties, including personal links, will remain 
too strong, and the potential of the Russian market too large, 
for German business circles to allow any confrontation be-
tween the two states. However, it seems that the German side 
is no longer as determined as it used to be to maintain special 
and strategic relations with the Russian Federation at any cost. 
In the aftermath of the crisis, Germany’s position in the EU has 
strengthened to such an extent that the world, including Rus-
sia, now sees Berlin as the key decision maker in the European 
Union’s policy and a state that is strong enough to freely choose 
its partners for co-operation. In Germany, this situation leads 
to the realisation that Russia is gradually losing its status as 
an “indispensable” partner for Germany. At the same time sec-
tions of the Russian elite are coming to the conclusion that Ger-
man policy may change direction in a way that will threaten 
Russian interests, or at best not take them into account. If this 
is not inspired by Germany, then at least it will be done with its 
approval.66
On the one hand, this situation may be seen as generating a lot of 
friction. This is especially the case since sections of the German 
political elite are aware that supporting Russia at any cost only 
strengthens Russian authoritarianism and “economic rapproche-
ment threatens to make German companies doing business in 
66 Hence, inter alia, the Russian repressions, the following examples of which 
will certainly not be the last example: the Russian offices of the main Ger-
man political foundations were not exempted from the massive checks car-
ried out in 2013 by the Russian security forces at selected non-governmental 
organisations, and deputy Andreas Schockenhoff has been declared persona 
non grata in Russia.
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
3/
20
14
43
Russia adopt Russian business standards.”67 This is for instance 
the position that the German president Joachim Gauck has taken 
– he has announced that he will boycott the Winter Olympics in 
Sochi. The unofficial reason concerned human rights violations in 
Russia. 
On the other hand, there are still optimists in Germany who see 
potential co-operation between the European Union and the Eur-
asian Union championed by Putin as a great opportunity.68 They 
believe that – should it materialise – the European Union and 
Germany itself could work together with a stable partner offer-
ing peace (including an absence of social upheavals) and good con-
ditions of trade. Another advantage of such an alliance would be 
that it would create a political and economic counterweight to the 
United States. This aspect is still more appealing to Russia than to 
Germany. 
The most likely course of developments is something between 
the extreme pessimistic and optimistic scenarios. Russia will 
undoubtedly remain a very important partner for Germany, al-
though the latter will be gaining more and more room for ma-
noeuvre in its negotiations with Russia and in decisions on the 
shape of its actual co-operation with the Russian Federation. The 
times when Germany uncritically endorsed Russia’s policy appear 
to be over. If Russia cannot find its way in this new situation, this 
will no longer be the problem of German politicians. They have 
time to wait for a new Russia.
AnnA KwIAtKowSKA-drożdż
The text was completed in December 2013 
67 J. Keuchel, Der Mann der zu viel wusste, Handelsblatt, 6.11.2013, http://
www.handelsblatt-shop.com/downloads/der-mann-der-zu-viel-wusste-
p5920.html
68 Cf.: M. Menkiszak, Greater Europe, op. cit.
